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Lotus v. Borland: Copyright and Computer
Programs
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.-
Since Congress's express acknowledgment of copyright protection for computer
programs in 1980, courts have faced the sometimes difficult task of deciding whether the
admitted copying of some elementfrom a copyright program constitutes infringement. In Lotus
v. Borland, for example, the question was whether the admitted copying by Borland of the
Lotus 1-2-3 menu structure constituted infringement. The district court held that it did; the
First Circuit held that it did not; and the Supreme Court was unable to decide. This Essay
suggests that the First Circuit's resolution is the correct one, but that the reasons the First
Circuit articulated for its result are either illogical or insufficient to justify its outcome. In
particular, copyright cannot deny protection to the Lotus menu structure because it is usefi4 as
the First Circuit reasoned, because such an approach would deny copyright protection for
computer programs generally. Rather, the decision whether to protect the Lotus menu structure
should turn on whether leaving the menu structure unprotected would give competitors an
undue advantage in copying the creativity embodied in the Lotus 1-2-3 program, when
compared to the advantage available to competitors copying creativity embodied in the wide
range of goods that copyright leaves unprotected Because the empirical evidence suggests
that leaving the Lotus menu structure unprotected would not give competitors such an undue
copying advantage, copyright should not extend its protection to the Lotus menu structure.
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In 1879, the Court, in Baker v. Selden, ruled that Baker had not
infringed the copyright in a work entitled "Selden's Condensed
Ledger, or Book-keeping Simplified," by reproducing blank
accounting forms substantially similar to those included in Selden's
copyrighted work Out of this decision grew the perception of a basic
dichotomy between patent and copyright: patent should protect useful
things, and copyright should not.2 Despite language in the Court's
Mazer v. Stein opinion that appeared to repudiate this dichotomy,3 the
notion that copyright ought not protect useful things remained a fixed
feature of copyright, at least until 1980 when Congress chose to
acknowledge copyright protection for computer programs.4 By doing
so, Congress recognized that copyright should and did protect
something that is literally nothing if not useful.
Because computer programs are inherently useful, some
commentators decried the acknowledgment as a betrayal of the very
nature of copyright, as if such a human construct could have a nature
other than the one we choose to give it. Despite these cries, courts
have had little difficulty accepting the general proposition that
copyright protects computer programs as creative works of authorship,
whether the program happens to be recorded in source code or object
code, whether stored in a floppy disk, a magnetic tape, a read-only
memory chip, or microcode, and whether intended to interact directly
with the user (applications programs) or within the computer itself
(operating system programs).5 The only real question courts have
1. 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99, 107 (1879).
2. The Constitution's Patent and Copyright clause speaks of "Writings and
Discoveries," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, and of "the Progress of Science and useful Arts,"
id., neither of which suggests a useful/not useful dichotomy.
3. See 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) ("The dichotomy of protection for the aesthetic is
not beauty and utility but art for the copyright and the invention of original and ornamental
design for design patents.").
4. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028-29 (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (West 1994)).
5. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F2d 521, 525 (9th Cir.
1984); Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249-53 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1177, 1178-80 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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struggled with is not whether copyright protects computer programs,
but whether, in a particular case, the admitted copying of some aspect,
element, or level of a copyrighted program constitutes copyright
infringement.6
This question arises because, while the plaintiff must establish
actual copying by the defendant to establish infringement, not every
instance of actual copying will trespass on the exclusive rights
copyright accords a work's author. As a result, courts must determine
not only whether the defendant has copied from the plaintiff's work,
but also whether the copying that occurred went so far as to constitute
an infringement. Even on this more difficult question, the concern has
not been that courts have decided particular cases incorrectly, but that
some of the language and reasoning the courts have used to reach
admittedly correct outcomes might lead to an inappropriate outcome in
some future case.7 Of course, in any new area, the courts usually
require some time to work out vagaries and false steps in their
reasoning, and so long as the results are essentially correct, flawed
reasoning alone has not usually led the Court to intervene.
Yet, that is what the Court appeared ready to do when it granted
certiorari in Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc.'
To resolve the case, the Court had to decide whether Borland had gone
too far, and thereby infringed Lotus's copyright9 in its Lotus 1-2-3
computer program, by copying the Lotus 1-2-3 "command
6. Compare Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 E2d 693, 705 (2d Cir.
1992) ("As we have already noted, a computer program's ultimate function or purpose is the
composite result of interacting subroutines.... [E]ach subroutine is itself a program, and
thus, may be said to have its own 'idea'....") with Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Labs,
Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[The line between idea and expression may be
drawn with reference to the end sought to be achieved by the work in question. In other
words, the purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's idea, and
everything that is not necessary to that purpose orfiunction would be part of the expression
of the idea."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
7. Of all the computer program copyright cases, probably none has drawn more
criticism than Whelan Associates. Yet, the criticism has focused almost exclusively on the
Third Circuit's approach to defining a computer program's idea(s), not on the finding of
infringement itself. Apparently, no one disagrees with finding infringement in a case where
someone, without authorization, takes copyrighted source code, and simply translates it into
another computer language, as Rand Jaslow did in the Whelan Associates case. See Whelan
Assocs., 797 E2d at 1226-27.
8. 49 E3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804
(1996).
9. As in Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879), the validity of Lotus's copyright in its
program is not disputed. See Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 813 & n.5.
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structure.""° The district court ruled that such copying established
infringement." The First Circuit reversed, ruling that such copying
did not.'
2
While I believe that the First Circuit correctly resolved the
infringement issue, its reasoning and language are troubling.
Specifically, the First Circuit ruled that copyright did not protect the
Lotus 1-2-3 command structure because the command structure was a
"method of operation."' 3 In reaching this conclusion, Judge Stahl,
writing for the panel, reasoned that the command structure constituted
a method of operation because it "provides the means by which users
control and operate Lotus 1-2-3."' 4
Yet, Judge Stahl's definition of "method of operation" is
potentially too broad. Taken literally, Judge Stahl's language would
seem to define every line of code in every computer program as a
method of operation, and hence unprotected. Judge Stahl apparently
recognized this difficulty with his language, 5 and attempted to exclude
program code from the reach of his ruling by noting that "while code is
necessary for the program to work, its precise formulation is not."'
6
However, when Lotus offered a parallel argument for protecting its
command structure, 7 Judge Stahl rejected the argument as irrelevant
to the "method of operation" issue." This internal inconsistency in
Judge Stahl's reasoning leaves key aspects of his "method of
operation" ruling unclear. While this inconsistency may not have led
10. The district court defined the term "menu" to refer "to a display on the computer
monitor of a limited number of commands available to the user at a given moment." Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F Supp. 203, 206 (D. Mass. 1992), adhered to 831 R
Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd, 49 E3d 807 (lst Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996). It defined the phrase "menu command" as "a command that
appears in a menu." Id. It defined the phrase "command structure" as "the organization of
the menus and menu commands." Id. I will use the same definitions of these terms in the
course of this Essay.
11. Lotus Dev. Corp., 799 . Supp. at 221.
12. Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 E3d at 819.
13. Id. at 815.
14. Id. at 815-18.
15. See id. at 816 n.ll.
16. Id. at 816.
17. Lotus argued that it could have, and indeed Borland did, design a different
command structure for an electronic spreadsheet program. Id. at 819. Thus, "while [a
command structure] is necessary for [an electronic spreadsheet] to work, its precise
formulation is not." Id
18. Id.
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to an incorrect result in the Lotus case itself, it may lead to
inappropriate results in future cases.
To resolve the Lotus case, the Court, therefore, faced not only the
task of deciding whether Borland's copying constituted copyright
infringement, 19 but also of providing a coherent explanation for why
certain elements in copyrighted works, although original, are not
protected. Unfortunately, after Justice Stevens recused himself, the
Court was unable to agree on either a proper resolution or rationale for
the case, and ended up affirming the First Circuit's decision by an
equally divided Court.2 In a similar context, the Court has treated its
summary dispositions as affirming the lower court's result, while
neither accepting nor rejecting the lower court's reasoning," and
presumably such treatment would be appropriate here. The Court's
resolution, thus, effectively disposes of the Lotus v. Borland case itself,
but leaves open broader questions concerning the proper scope of
copyright protection for computer programs, and the reasons why
copyright should leave some elements, although original, unprotected.
These broader questions are the focus of this Essay.
I IDENTIFYING UNPROTECrED ELEMENTS
At the outset, I begin with two basic propositions of copyright
law. First, copyright does not protect those aspects of a work, even if
original, that a court identifies as "idea"; it only protects those aspects
that a court identifies as "expression." Second, once a court has
19. There are actually two aspects of Borland's program at issue. In its original
program, Borland included a "Lotus Emulation Mode," which when activated by the user,
would cause the Borland program to respond to the user's keystrokes in a manner identical
to the way in which the Lotus 1-2-3 program would respond to those keystrokes. When the
district court held that this mode constituted copyright infringement, Borland removed the
Lotus Emulation Mode from its program, and added a "Key Reader" that would read and
perform macros written for use with the Lotus 1-2-3 program. See id. at 811-12. I will not
consider these issues separately, although I do not agree with the district court that a finding
of infringement with respect to the Lotus Emulation Mode necessarily dictates a finding of
infringement with respect to the Key Reader. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc.,
831 F Supp. 223, 234-35 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd, 49 F3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996). Instead, because of time and space
limitations, I will focus solely on whether the Lotus Emulation Mode, and its reuse of the
Lotus 1-2-3 command structure, constituted copyright infringement.
20. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
21. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975) (the result reached in
summary disposition is binding on lower courts).
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identified a work's ideas, the court must also leave unprotected22 any
elements that are "'as a practical matter indispensable, or at least
standard, in the treatment of"' the work's ideas.23 One way of
approaching the Lotus case, therefore, is to ask, first, what are the
unprotected aspects of the Lotus 1-2-3 program-its "ideas"--and to
ask, second, whether a later work that borrows those ideas must
necessarily incorporate the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure. If a later
work that borrows the ideas contained in the Lotus 1-2-3 program
must necessarily incorporate the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure, then
taking the command structure should not constitute infringement. 24
On the other hand, if the command structure is only one of many ways
of expressing those ideas, then taking the command structure should
constitute infringement.
While this approach seems reasonably straightforward, the
difficulty in using this approach lies in identifying those elements of a
work that, although original, constitute unprotected idea. Consider, for
example, the difference between the results the First Circuit and the
district court reached in the Lotus case itself. If we put to one side
Judge Stahl's "method of operation" language, which is neither
necessary nor helpful, both the First Circuit and the district court
22. By "leave unprotected," I mean that similarities between a copyrighted work and
a later work in ideas, or elements that necessarily result from common ideas, can neither
support an inference that the later work borrowed from the original, nor amount to an
infringing or unlawfil appropriation. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright's
Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REv. 483 (1996).
23. Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 616 (7th
Cir.) (quoting Alexander v. Haley, 460 F. Supp. 40, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 880 (1982).
24. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879) ("[W]here the art [i.e., a work] it
teaches cannot be used without employing the methods and diagrams used to illustrate the
book, or such as are similar to them, such methods and diagrams are to be considered as
necessary incidents to the art, and given therewith to the public; not given for the purpose of
publication in other works explanatory of the art, but for the purpose of practical
application.").
25. As Judge Keeton correctly noted, there is no indication that Congress intended
the "method of operation" language it included in section 102(b) of the Copyright Act to
affect a court's application of the idea-expression dichotomy. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 R Supp. 203, 215-16 (D. Mass. 1992), adhered to 831 F Supp. 223
(D. Mass. 1993), rev'd, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116
S. Ct. 804 (1996); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in
1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 ("Section 102(b) in no way enlarges or contracts the scope
of copyright protection under the present law. Its purpose is to restate, in the context of the
new single Federal system of copyright, that the basic dichotomy between expression and
idea remains unchanged.").
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used similar approaches to resolving the infringement question. Both
focused on whether reuse of the Lotus 1-2-3 program's ideas
necessarily required use of the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure.
Moreover, both attempted to define the program's idea(s) by applying,
implicitly or expressly, the levels of abstraction approach that Judge
Learned Hand articulated in Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.26 The
central and, to a large extent, only difference between the two
decisions is the level of abstraction the respective courts identified as
unprotected idea.
The district court identified the unprotected idea of Lotus's user
interface as:
[a] user interface [that] involves a system of menus, each menu
consisting of less than a dozen commands, arranged hierarchically,
forming a tree in which the main menu is the root/trunk of the tree and
submenus branch off from higher menus, each submenu being linked
to a higher menu by operation of a command, so that all the specific
spreadsheet operations available in [the program] are accessible
through the paths of the menu command hierarchy.27
Given this definition of the idea, it becomes obvious that the particular
commands, the arrangement of those commands within particular
menus, and the particular relationships between the various
commands, menus, and submenus selected by Lotus to express this
idea are only one of many ways of creating such a user interface.
Borland could, therefore, reuse the identified idea without having to
borrow Lotus's particular command structure. As a result, Borland's
taking of the command structure, given its importance within the
Lotus program, should establish infringement, and so the district court
concluded.'
The First Circuit, on the other hand, implicitly adopted a more
concrete level of abstraction as the level where the work was
unprotected. It identified the idea of the Lotus user interface as a user
interface that consists of "that precise set of menu commands selected
by Lotus, arranged hierarchically precisely as they appear in 1-2-3."'29
26. 45 E2d 119, 121-22 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
27. Lotus Dev. Corp., 799 F. Supp. at 216.
28. Id. at218-22.
29. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 815-19 (1st Cir. 1995),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996). As mentioned, Judge Stahl
actually discussed the issue in terms of "methods of operation," rather than in terms of
"levels of abstraction," see id. at 816; as a result, I have used the district court's definition of
2403
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Given this definition of the idea, it becomes equally obvious that the
particular commands, the arrangement of those commands within
particular menus, and the particular relationships between the various
commands, menus, and submenus that Lotus selected are part of the
work's ideas, and, hence, are unprotected. As a result, Borland's
taking of that structure should not establish infringement, and so the
First Circuit concluded.3°
The key difference, then, that led the district court and the First
Circuit to contrary conclusions regarding infringement is the differing
level of abstraction each selected as the level where the Lotus 1-2-3
program interface became unprotected. To evaluate the two decisions,
we turn, therefore, to the reasons each court gave for identifying a
particular level of abstraction as unprotected idea.
I. SEPARATING IDEA FROM ExPREsSIoN
In addressing this issue, we should recognize that while the levels
of abstraction approach presents a useful way of formulating the
question to be answered, it does not itself define the level of
abstraction at which a work becomes unprotected. The approach can
help us identify more abstract, and more concrete, levels within a
work, but it does not determine whether any given level is sufficiently
abstract to warrant the label "idea," or sufficiently concrete to warrant
the label "expression." To resolve that issue, courts must look outside
the levels of abstraction approach itself to the policies that underlie
copyright to determine whether protecting a particular level of
abstraction would advance or disserve copyright's goals.
A. The First Circuit's Approach
The First Circuit, in its opinion, articulated three such policy
concerns that it believed justified identifying Lotus's particular
command structure as idea. First, after quoting Baker v. Selden, Judge
Stahl suggested that because "Lotus wrote its menu command
hierarchy so that people could learn it and use it," the command
the level of abstraction equivalent to the one that the First Circuit implicitly adopted. See
Lotus Dev. Corp., 799 F. Supp. at 216.
30. See Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 E3d at 819.
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1996] COPYRIGHT AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS
structure must be denied protection.3' Second, once a user has learned
to use the Lotus command structure, she will be reluctant to switch to
some other electronic spreadsheet because of the retraining costs
involved. 2 Copyright, therefore, must limit its protection of the Lotus
command structure to avoid trapping users into a particular program,
and must allow others to copy the Lotus command structure to the
extent necessary to minimize the retraining costs Lotus users would
incur in switching to another spreadsheet program.33 Third, progress
in computer programming depends more heavily on building on the
work of others. To ensure progress in the computer programming
field, copyright should therefore limit its protection for computer
programs and allow later authors a degree of copying leeway with
respect to programs, greater than the degree copyright allows for more
traditional forms of literature.34
While a number of courts and commentators have cited these
policy concerns as justifications for denying or limiting copyright
protection for useful things generally, and for computer programs
specifically, none of them is persuasive.
1. Policy Concern #1: Copyright Must Limit Its Protection for
Useful Works to Ensure That People Can Use Them
In articulating the first policy concern, the Baker Court began
with the proposition that a copyright on a work describing a
mathematical or scientific art did not prevent someone from using the
art described:
A treatise on the composition and use of medicines, be they old or
new; on the construction and use of ploughs, or watches, or chums; or
on the mixture and application of colors for painting or dyeing; or on
the mode of drawing lines to produce the effect of perspective ...
would be the subject of copyright; but no one would contend that the
copyright of the treatise would give the exclusive right to the art or
manufacture described therein.35
31. Id. at 817. In Baker v. Selden, the Court stated: "But this object [use of the art
described] would be frustrated if the knowledge could not be used without incurring the
guilt of piracy of the book." 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1879).
32. See Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 E3d at 818.
33. See id. at 817-18.
34. See id. at 818.
35. Baker, 101 U.S. at 102.
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As a starting point for the Baker Court's reasoning, this statement
seems, at best, a bit odd. Neither Lotus, nor Selden before it, was
seeking to prevent individuals from using the command structure, or
the accounting system. Rather, both were attempting to prevent a
competitor from marketing a competing product that had duplicated an
important and original component of the copyrighted work.36
Moreover, if Lotus or Selden had been attempting to prevent someone
from using their respective works, such an attempt would fail, not
because of the idea/expression dichotomy, but because copyright law,
unlike patent law, does not forbid an individual from using a
copyrighted work.37 Aside from rights that are not relevant here,38
copyright only forbids an individual from making an unauthorized
reproduction of the copyrighted work. Simply applying the art taught,
or using the program itself would not constitute infringement any more
than would reading a traditional literary work, listening to a copy of a
musical work, or viewing an audio-visual work.
The second step taken by both Judge Stahl and the Baker Court
in explicating the first policy concern is equally troubling. Both
suggest that "[t]he very object of publishing a book on science or the
useful arts is to communicate to the world the useful knowledge which
it contains."" As a factual matter, this assertion is almost certainly
false. While there are undoubtedly those who create their works,
whether entertaining or useful, solely so that others may enjoy or use
36. Cf id. at 104 ('"he use by another of the same methods of statement, whether in
words or illustrations, in a book published for teaching the art, would undoubtedly be an
infringement of the copyright.").
37. In the case of computer programs, an individual must make at least one, and
typically two or more copies of the program, in order to use the program. For example,
when I recently purchased Microsoft Office for my home computer, I had to make two
additional copies in order to use the program. First, I had to copy the program to my hard
drive, and second, whenever I ran the program, I necessarily created a second copy in the
active memory of my computer. While I might argue that such copying is justified under
either an implied license theory or as fair use of the copyrighted work should Microsoft
object to my copies, CONTU proposed and Congress amended section 117 to authorize the
making of such copies by the owner of a copy of a computer program. See NATIONAL
COMM. ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES, FINAL REPoi'r 12-13 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU,
FINALREPORT]; see also 17 U.S.C. § 117 (West 1994).
38. Copyright law also forbids the unauthorized creation of a derivative work,
unauthorized public performance, and unauthorized public display of certain copyrighted
works. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2), (4), (5) (West 1994).
39. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 F3d
807, 817 (1st Cir. 1995) ("Lotus wrote its menu command hierarchy so that people could
learn it and use it."), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
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them, both Lotus and Selden appear to have a more pecuniary motive
in mind. For both Lotus and Selden, and for authors generally, the
"very object of publishing a book" whether on a useful art, or as a
form of entertainment, is to make money.
Finally, the Baker Court suggests that copyright should treat
works explaining a useful art differently than "ornamental designs, or
pictorial illustrations addressed to the taste,"40 because the "teachings
of science and the rules and methods of useful art have their final end
in application and use."'41 "[O]mamental designs, or pictorial illus-
trations addressed to the taste," on the other hand, have as "their
object, the production of pleasure in their contemplation."42 Yet, this
suggestion, even if true, does not justify the Court's decision to limit
copyright protection of useful works.
For either category of work, more extensive copyright protection
will impose more extensive constraints on the freedom of others to
copy, without authorization, from the original work. Such protection
will both: (i) limit the ability of others to offer competing substitutes
for the original work; and (ii) increase the expense such competitors
must incur to create their substitutes. Together, these two effects will
limit the ability of later authors to offer perfect or near-perfect
substitutes43 for the earlier copyrighted work, and will increase the
price competitors must charge to cover the costs of creating and
40. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
41. Id. at 104.
42. Id. at 103-04; see also id. at 105 ("the object of the one is explanation; the
object of the other is use.").
43. Some commentators have become excessively casual in their use of the word
"perfect substitute." See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2319 & n.29 (1994)
(suggesting that clones of Lotus 1-2-3 were perfect substitutes for Lotus 1-2-3). By
definition, one product is a perfect substitute for another only if all of the relevant consumers
would instantly switch to the second product given any increase in the price of the first
product. Because of uncertainty, information costs, and a host of other factors, perfect
substitutes are extremely rare outside of economic theory. As a result, if a clone were, in
fact, a perfect substitute for the original, then the author of the original could charge no more
for copies of the original than the clone-maker was charging for copies of the clone. Yet,
even when Paperback and Mosaic were selling their "clones" of Lotus 1-2-3, Lotus was able
to price its product profitably at a point well above the prices at which Paperback and
Mosaic were selling their programs. Of course, the Paperback and Mosaic clones did
reduce, to some extent, Lotus's profit-maximizing price for copies of its programs. From
this, we can infer that at least some consumers considered the clones acceptable substitutes,
given the price discount, for a copy of the higher priced Lotus 1-2-3 program. But the
clones were not perfect substitutes.
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publishing their competing works. Because the author of the original
work will face less-perfect substitutes and less intense price
competition, more extensive copyright protection allows the original
author to charge somewhat more for copies of her work. But this
increase in price would occur with respect to either useful works or
entertaining works, and would render the end use of either sort of work
more expensive.
For example, if copyright prohibited competitors from making
unauthorized blank forms compatible with Selden's accounting
system, then users of Selden's system will have to turn to Selden for
such forms. Such an absence of direct competition may allow Selden
to charge users a somewhat higher price for the accounting forms than
he could charge if competitors, such as Baker, could reproduce and sell
copies of Selden's blank accounting forms without Selden's
authorization. Interpreting copyright to prohibit copying of the blank
accounting forms may,44 therefore, make use of Selden's accounting
system somewhat more expensive. But copyright protection of
ornamental designs has the same effect. Specifically, if copyright
prohibited competitors from reproducing and selling copies of a
popular author's latest best-seller, or a popular artist's latest creation,
then consumers of that author's or artist's work would be forced to
turn to the author or artist for copies of her works. Such an absence of
direct competition would allow either author or artist to charge
consumers somewhat more for copies of her work, than she could
charge if competitors could, without authorization, reproduce and sell
copies of her work. Such copyright protection would, therefore, make
"the production of pleasure in [such work's] contemplation" more
expensive.45
Thus, the mere fact that useful works are intended to be used in
one way, to perform some specific task, while entertaining works are
meant to be used in another, "the production of pleasure in their
contemplation," does not, on its own, justify varying the scope of
protection copyright accords the two categories of works. More
44. Unless the author can inappropriately increase her market power by switching
her monopoly surcharge from the initial work, which hooks consumers, to her later works
that are necessary to continue using the system, simply switching her surcharge from the
initial work to later works necessary to use the system would not necessarily increase the
total price a consumer would pay for the work and the supplies or later works necessary to
use the system taught in the original work.
45. Baker, 101 U.S. at 103-04.
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extensive protection may render the end use of either type of work
somewhat more expensive, but it does so for either type of work. The
Baker Court's analysis of the first policy concern cannot, therefore,
justify narrowing the protection for the Lotus 1-2-3 program simply
because the program is intended to be used.
Nevertheless, before leaving this policy concern, three arguments
concerning useful works that the Baker Court could have made, but
did not, might complete the link between the first policy concern and
the need to limit protection for useful works. First, extensive
copyright protection of useful works might arguably impose greater
deadweight losses on consumers than extensive protection of
entertaining works because consumers are more likely to need a useful
work. Second, extensive copyright protection of useful works might
arguably impose greater deadweight losses on consumers than
extensive protection of entertaining works because of the greater costs
incurred when a user switches from one useful work to another. Third,
without regard to the relative deadweight losses involved, the higher
price that broader copyright would enable an author to charge is
arguably more problematic when associated with a useful work, than
with an entertaining work, because useful works are necessities, while
entertaining works are luxuries. Because Judge Stahl articulated the
second of these three arguments as an independent policy concern, I
will consider it in the next section. Before getting there, however, the
first and third arguments warrant brief discussion.
With respect to the first scenario, the argument here is essentially
that because a consumer may more realistically be said to "need" a
useful work, whereas she, at best, really "wants" an entertaining work,
the author of a useful work can more easily force the consumer to pay
the price she demands. As a result, if copyright were to provide
equivalent protection for both useful and entertaining works, such
protection would enable the authors of useful works to force
consumers to pay a price for access to their respective works much
higher than the price that the authors of entertaining works could
charge for access to their works. This higher price would, in turn,
impose a more substantial deadweight loss on consumers. As a final
step, the argument concludes by suggesting that because of the greater
deadweight losses such protection would entail, copyright should limit
its protection of useful works.
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One difficulty with this argument is that it rests upon the
unproven empirical assertion that equivalent protection of useful and
entertaining works would impose greater deadweight losses with
respect to useful works than it would with respect to entertaining
works. Neither the Baker Court, nor Judge Stahl, nor any
commentator I have seen has undertaken to establish this empirical
assertion. Moreover, when commentators do approach the issue, they
often take a decidedly slanted approach to measuring the deadweight
losses involved. A mark-up in price of four hundred percent over the
price of allegedly competing works is routinely treated as no indication
of market power when discussing entertaining works. 6 Yet, for these
same commentators, a similar four hundred percent mark-up with
respect to a useful work would establish monopoly.
The third argument avoids this empirical issue of the relative
deadweight losses imposed by simply asserting that the exact
magnitude of the deadweight losses involved does not matter. Useful
works are, if not necessities, far more like necessities, than entertaining
works. Moreover, by definition, people can do without luxuries. As a
result, limiting access to a necessity will always be a more serious
concern, without regard to the particular dollar value involved, than
limiting access to a luxury. We must, therefore, more carefully
circumscribe copyright's protection of useful works, than of
entertaining works, precisely because they are useful, or so the third
argument concludes.
Yet, both this argument and the first argument are ultimately self-
defeating. Take the first argument, and assume that we can show
empirically that the deadweight losses associated with protecting
useful works is greater than the losses associated with protecting
entertaining works. Greater deadweight loss alone should not serve,
however, as a justification for limiting protection. Given similar
protection against imitators, if the deadweight loss associated with one
work is greater than that associated with another, that difference will
usually indicate a greater demand for, and hence social value
associated with, the first good as compared to the second. In other
words, given similar protection against imitators, the more valuable a
46. See Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 79, 84 (1992)
(noting that popular authors can sell copies of their works at a price four times that of
"paperback reprints of the classics"; yet dismissing it as no indication of market power).
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work, the greater the deadweight loss that such protection will create.47
As a result, if we limit protection to minimize deadweight losses, we
will necessarily reduce the protection we provide more valuable
works. Such reduced protection will, in turn, reduce the incentive for
investing in the more valuable class or category of works, relative to
the incentive available for investing in the less valuable class or
category of works, and will effectively encourage individuals to invest
in the less valuable works. At the margins, such a skewed incentive
system will lead individuals to invest in admittedly less valuable
works, rather than admittedly more valuable works, because we have
provided greater protection against imitation for the less valuable
works.
Such a result is not only inefficient and unfair, it is also contrary
to the purported objective these two arguments sought to achieve.
Specifically, both arguments sought to limit protection, after-the-fact,
in order to ensure access to a useful or necessary work once the work
has been created. But if the arguments convince us to limit protection
for useful or necessary works, then we will necessarily reduce the
incentives, before-the-fact, for future authors to invest their efforts in
creating such works. As a result, limiting protection is likely to lead to
fewer such works being created, and thereby to reduce access to such
necessitous works as a whole.
2. Policy Concern #2: Copyright Should Limit Its Protection for
Useful Works to Avoid Imposing Undue Switching Costs
As a second policy concern that would justify limiting protection
for the Lotus command structure, Judge Stahl argued that requiring the
command structures of programs to differ would lead to the "absurd"
result that users would have to learn a new command structure each
time they used a different program. hile not well articulated, Judge
Stahl's concern appears to be that users who become trained in the
Lotus 1-2-3 command structure will be reluctant to incur the retraining
47. As a result, Judge Boudin's suggestion that the benefit of protecting useful and
entertaining works is the same, while the cost of protecting useful works is higher, see Lotus
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 3d 807, 819 (lst Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996), is wrong. If the cost of providing
a given degree of protection for useful works is higher, then necessarily the benefit of
providing such protection will also be correspondingly higher.
48. See Lotus Dev. Corp., 49 F.3d at 818.
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expenses necessary to switch to another spreadsheet if that other
spreadsheet incorporated a different command structure. Because of
the difficulty and expense such retraining would require, protecting the
Lotus command structure would enable Lotus to extract from its
existing users an excessive price for future upgrades of its program,
just as protecting Selden's accounting system would enable Selden to
extract an excessive price from existing users for the forms necessary
to use his system. Further, the argument concludes, because an
author's ability to charge excessive49 prices for future upgrades of the
program, or for the materials necessary to use a system, will depend on
the switching costs involved, copyright can and should allow
competitors to copy, without authorization, those elements necessary
to keep switching costs to a minimum.
This policy concern, however, is also unpersuasive as a
justification for denying protection to the Lotus 1-2-3 command
structure, specifically, or for limiting protection for useful works more
generally. Initially, before protection of the Lotus 1-2-3 command
structure will implicate this policy concern at all, three preconditions
must be satisfied. First, competition for new consumers and potential
consumers of its program must not effectively limit Lotus's ability to
exploit consumers who have already purchased, learned the command
structure of, and thereby become locked into the Lotus 1-2-3 program.
The Court has previously addressed a similar issue in Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc.50 In Eastman Kodak Co., the
Court ruled that information costs and uncertainty may prevent
competition in the market for new and potential consumers from
effectively limiting a company's market power over a locked-in
consumer.51 As a result, a company may have market power over such
locked-in consumers, even though it did not have market power in the
initial entry, or new user, market.52 While the markets for programs
49. In Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., the Court discussed this
issue in terms of whether the lock-in effect enabled a user to charge a "supracompetitive"
price. 504 U.S. 451, 472-78 (1992). Because copyright, by prohibiting copying, ordinarily
and intentionally enables an author to charge a "supracompetitive" price (i.e., a price above
marginal cost) for copies of her work, see, e.g., CONTU, FINAL REPORT, supra note 37, at
23, the lock-in effect is objectionable with respect to a copyrighted work only if it would
enable an author to charge a price in excess of the supracompetitive price copyright would
ordinarily enable authors to charge.
50. 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
51. Id. at 465-78.
52. Id.
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and copiers differ in potentially material ways, the Eastman Kodak
Court's ruling suggests at least the possibility that Lotus may have
inappropriate 53 market power over locked-in consumers, even if it
lacks inappropriate market power in the new user market.
Nevertheless, before applying this policy concern to deny protection to
the Lotus command structure, a court would need evidence that would
support a finding that protecting Lotus's command structure would
give Lotus a degree of market power over its locked-in consumers in
excess of the market power copyright customarily provides an author.
Second, there must be some showing that the switching costs
involved, if copyright protected the Lotus command structure, are
significant. If we assume that the first precondition has been satisfied,
we can estimate the extent of the additional market power that
protecting the Lotus command structure would give Lotus over its
existing users by examining the extent of the switching costs involved.
If we put to one side other market imperfections that will remain
however the Court resolves the copyright issues raised in the Lotus
case,54 an existing user will switch to some other spreadsheet program
if Lotus should attempt to incorporate in the price for its upgrades a
"locked-in surcharge" greater than the costs that the user would incur
to switch to another program.55 As a result, we should worry about a
"lock-in" effect only when the switching costs involved rise to a
53. Because copyright intentionally awards an author some degree of market power
in order to ensure the creation of sufficient works, Lotus will undoubtedly have some market
power in both the new user and established user markets. The issue, then, is not whether
Lotus has market power, but whether information costs or other market imperfections grant
Lotus additional, and therefore inappropriate, market power over its established users
because of the costs involved in switching to another electronic spreadsheet program. As a
result, a court should not look simply for "supracompetitive" prices, as the Eastman Kodak
Court suggested, but for prices in excess of the supracompetitive price copyright customarily
ensures.
54. For a variety of reasons, consumers may remain reluctant to switch to another
program, even if the program offers equivalent functionality. See Caroline A. Duffy, Big 3
Strive for Spreadsheet Dominance, PC WEEK, Dec. 14, 1992, at 133 (noting that some users
"will always stay with 1-2-3").
55. Such switching costs would include the cost of retraining to use the other
program, and the cost of transferring existing data files that the consumer will need to use
the new program. It will also include the price of any additional hardware or software
required for the switch, but keep in mind that the consumer is presumably deciding to switch
because of the excessive surcharge incorporated into the price of a Lotus 1-2-3 upgrade. As
a result, a proper measure of switching costs must also consider the money saved by not
having to buy the overpriced Lotus 1-2-3 upgrade.
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significant level. 6 If they are trivial, in comparison to the price of the
program being purchased, then the additional market power Lotus
might receive, even assuming the first precondition is satisfied, is
probably not worth worrying about.
Third, even if the switching costs are significant, they must also
be disproportionate to the switching costs a consumer would
experience with respect to more traditional copyrighted works before
they can justify limiting copyright's protection for computer programs
as a class. Some commentators readily assume that such switching
costs are more substantial in the case of useful works than in the case
of entertaining works for reasons. similar to those previously discussed
in addressing the first policy concern. However, no one has taken the
time to establish this empirical proposition.
Moreover, a cursory examination of practices with respect to
entertaining works suggests that copyright imposes substantial
switching costs on those who purchase entertaining works. Consider
the case of sequels to popular works. If a consumer purchases and
enjoys the first work in a fictional series, she will often purchase the
second work as well. Two reasons account for this. First, a consumer
is likely to respond to the second work in a series in a manner similar
to her response to the first work. If she liked the first work, that
suggests she is likely to enjoy the second work as well, and helps her
to distinguish the second work in a series from all of the other works
she might read. By providing such information, the first work reduces
the uncertainty involved in purchasing the second work, and thereby
makes the second work more valuable to the consumer. Second, in
addition to the quality-certification function, a consumer who has read
and enjoyed the first work may, and the author hopes will, become
emotionally and intellectually involved with the characters that appear
in the first work. Having become emotionally and intellectually
involved with those characters, the consumer will want to share the
future experiences of those specific characters to see how things turn
56. Indeed, given that such switching costs are ubiquitous in our economy, even the
presence of substantial switching costs were copyright to protect the Lotus command
structure would not, on its own, justify denying protection to the command structure. See
R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 22 Rax. ECON. STUD.
11, 16-17 (1956) (arguing that if monopolistic elements are present in one sector of an
economy, presence of monopolistic elements in other sectors of the economy may be
required to enhance overall welfare).
2414 [Vol. 70:2397
1996] COPYRIGHT AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS
out. The experience of other characters, or the events in other works,
will not do.
Because of these two considerations, consumers are "willing" to
pay more for, or endure a lower quality work, in order to obtain a
sequel, rather than settle for some other work available on the market.
Moreover, their decision to do so appears, in part, to be the result of
network externalities or switching costs similar to those locked-in
Lotus 1-2-3 users might experience if copyright protected the Lotus
command structure. Consumers have become emotionally involved
with the specific characters presented in the first work; copyright
prohibits others from copying those specific characters;57 and a
consumer is therefore "locked into" the sequels that the original author
writes or chooses to authorize. If we use the network analogy some
commentators have suggested as a way of thinking about this policy
concern, the specific characters found in the first work define a
relevant network. Works that do not share those specific characters
are, in a sense, not on the relevant network, and therefore suffer a
competitive disadvantage. As a result of this lock-in effect or network
externality, sequels usually command a higher price, or sell a greater
quantity, than a stand-alone work of otherwise equivalent quality
would.
57. Compare Kouf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television, 16 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th
Cir. 1994) (noting that "genius kid with thick-rimmed glasses in [the plaintiff's work] is not
distinctive enough to be a protectible character") and Olson v. National Broadcasting Co.,
855 F2d 1446, 1453 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that characters of Cargo "were drawn [too]
thinly") and Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 654 F.2d 204, 208-10 (2d
Cir. 1981) (explaining that protection of Superman character did not extend to that level of
abstraction where his characteristics became common "in the superhero genre") and Nichols
v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (stating that "it would not be
enough [to infringe Shakespeare's Twelfth Night if it were copyrighted to] cast a riotous
knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the household, or a vain and foppish steward
who became amorous of his mistress."), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931) with Mattel, Inc.
v. Azrak-Hamway Int'l, Inc., 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (noting that
"accentuat[ion of] certain muscle groups relative to others" distinguishes plaintiff's
superhero toy from other superhero musclemen) and Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns
Publications, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433-34 (2d Cir. 1940) (referring to a preexisting public
domain character, "benevolent Hercules," in defining limits of copyright's protection) and
Anderson v. Stallone, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166-67 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (extending protection
to main characters from the Rocky films as a group, and to Rocky Balboa character
individually) and Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1344, 1355 (S.D.N.Y 1986) (stating
that personifications of "Amos 'n Andy" characters sufficiently distinctive to warrant
protection) and Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of Gen. Mills Fun Group, Inc., 443 F.
Supp. 291, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding "Star Wars" characters sufficiently distinctive to
warrant protection).
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Further, given our analysis of the first policy concern, we cannot
simply assert that switching costs are necessarily more troubling for
useful works than for entertaining works.5 8 Instead, we must examine,
as best we can, the empirical magnitude of the switching costs
copyright presently imposes for entertaining works, with the likely
magnitude of the switching costs copyright would impose if it
protected the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure. While a detailed
empirical examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Essay,
readily available figures suggest that copyright, by granting an author a
monopoly over her characters, creates a substantial network
externality. Figures associated with the sequel to Gone with the
Wind,59 for example, suggest that as between two otherwise equivalent
works, a work "on the network" (i.e., one that includes the desired
characters) may earn more than eleven times the earnings of an
otherwise equivalent work not on the network (i.e., one that does not
include the desired characters).6° Nothing I have seen suggests that
protecting Lotus's command structure would create a more substantial
58. The argument that others can create their own characters and thereby develop
their own networks is similarly irrelevant, unless the availability of alternative networks
limits an author's market power over locked-in users of her network.
59. This work is one of the most popular of this century, and may create more
substantial network externalities than less popular entertaining works. Nevertheless, to the
extent Lotus 1-2-3 was once one of the most popular computer programs, it is appropriate to
compare the magnitude of the network externality protecting its command structure would
create with the network externalities copyright creates for entertaining works of comparable
popularity.
60. Consider, for example, the works of Alexandra Ripley, who Margaret Mitchell's
heirs chose to write the sequel to Gone with the Wind. Presumably, Ripley's writing has
remained of reasonably consistent quality; the difference between the sales volume and the
price charged for Scarlett, her Gone with the Wind sequel, and her other Southern romance
works, should give some indication of the network externality associated with copyright's
protection of the Gone with the Wind characters. On her first work after Scarlett, From
Fields of Gold, her publisher had to offer a six-dollar credit to retailers for every hardbound
copy of Fields they could sell, and suggested that retailers charge $12.50 for the $24.95 title,
in order to move hardbound copies of the work. See David Streitfeld, Good News, Bad
News, WASH. PosT, Feb. 12, 1995, at X15. Similarly, Ripley's novels prior to Scarlett had
become best-sellers only in paperback. See Edwin McDowell, Writer Named to Turn Out
"Gone with the Wind" Sequel, Cm. I'm., Apr. 21, 1988, at 13G. Thus, Ripley was able to
sell copies of the sequel at between two and four times the price at which she could sell
copies of her nonsequel works. Moreover, if we look to sales volume, Ripley sold more
than two-and-a-half million hardbound copies of Scarlett, while only 900,000 paperback
copies of her work New Orleans Legacy were printed. See Edwin McDowell, Sequel to
Auction of 'Gone with the Wind' Sequel, N.Y. Tu, Apr. 27, 1988, at C24. If we compare
gross sales value for these two Ripley works, Scarlett grossed more than eleven times New
Orleans Legacy on its hardbound publication alone.
2416
1996] COPYRIGHT AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS
network externality. On the contrary, prices for upgrades to an existing
Lotus 1-2-3 program, which is where the lock-in surcharge would
appear, are usually far less than the price of acquiring the Lotus 1-2-3
program initially.6' In any event, unless empirical evidence has
demonstrated that the lock-in surcharge is greater than the parallel
surcharge we tolerate given copyright's extensive protection of
entertaining works, the second policy concern cannot justify extending
less copyright protection to useful works or computer programs than
we give to entertaining works.
Establishing these three preconditions presents considerable
difficulty for commentators or courts who would rely on the second
policy concern as a justification for limiting the protection copyright
affords useful works and computer programs. Nevertheless, for the
sake of argument, let's assume that all three preconditions have been
satisfied, and that protecting Lotus's command structure would give
Lotus the ability to exploit its locked-in users to an extent both
substantial and significantly greater than the comparable exploitation
ability copyright gives the authors of entertaining works. Even under
such assumptions, the second policy concern does not, on its own,
justify limiting protection for the Lotus command structure.
As Figure 1 illustrates, there is some degree of copyright
protection that will lead to the optimal production of copyrighted
works.
61. See, e.g., Randy Ross, A Bit of Windows in 1-2-3- release 4, PC WORLD, Jan.
1994, at 74 (estimating street price of upgraded package to be $350 for new users and $100
for existing Lotus users). To compete for existing users of other spreadsheets, Lotus,
Borland, and Microsoft, the big three among spreadsheets, have offered competitive
upgrades, where they will sell the present version of their spreadsheet to users of one of the
other spreadsheets at a substantial discount off the full price of their programs. See Duffy,
supra note 54, at 133.
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Figure 1. Social Welfare as a Function








As Figure 1 suggests, providing either too little protection or too much
protection can generate a suboptimal level of social welfare. As a
result, even if protecting the Lotus command structure would
"overprotect" the Lotus program, such overprotection on its own
cannot justify limiting protection for the Lotus command structure. A
court would first have to determine whether denying protection to the
Lotus command structure would provide the Lotus 1-2-3 program with
too little protection. If it would, which is an issue that I will address
later in this Essay,62 then the court must choose between
overprotecting and underprotecting the Lotus program. Depending on
the relative degrees of overprotection and underprotection involved,
protecting the Lotus command structure may come closer to achieving
the optimal level of copyright protection than refusing to protect the
command structure, even if protecting the command structure would
give Lotus excessive market power over its locked-in users.
As a result, identifying a network externality or switching cost
that protection would create cannot justify limiting copyright's
protection for particular elements of a copyrighted work. Even if
62. See infra text accompanying notes 101-08.
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protection would create such an externality, and thereby overprotect a
work, extending protection may represent a closer-to-optimal choice
than denying protection. As a result, the second policy concern, while
it may prove relevant to deciding whether copyright should protect the
Lotus command structure, cannot, on its own, justify denying
protection to the Lotus command structure.
3. Policy Concern #3: Incremental Progress Requires Copying
As a third policy concern that would justify limiting protection
for the Lotus command structure, Judge Stahl argued that "[i]n the
context of [computer programs] ... , 'building' requires the use of the
precise method of operation already employed; otherwise, 'building'
would require dismantling, too."63 While his physical construction
metaphor is not particularly apt to the task of computer programming,
Judge Stahl appears to be articulating a concern other courts and
commentators have shared: Because progress in technological fields is
incremental, copyright must allow later authors greater copying leeway
to assure the desired progress. Again, however, this policy concern
does not justify limiting protection for the Lotus command structure.
Incrementalism is not unique to functional works. As an
engineer and a lawyer, I have created both functional and entertaining
works, and have found that the ability to copy earlier works smoothes
my authorship path for either type of work both in similar ways and to
a similar degree. Nor do I believe that my experience in that regard is
unique. Even if one acknowledges that incrementalism is more
common with respect to technological and functional works than it is
in literature and the arts, that still proves nothing with respect to
copyright's proper scope. It establishes only that creative workers in
the respective industries have adapted to copyright's historic practice
of protecting entertaining works extensively, while protecting useful
works narrowly, if at all.64
Further, even if incrementalism is essential to progress in fields
such as computer programming, no reason appears why later authors
could not license the elements they find themselves in need of
63. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 49 E3d 807, 818 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'dby
an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
64. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Note, Copyright Protection for ASIC Gate




reusing.65  Patent law, for example, expressly protects the useful arts,
yet it has no compulsory licensing provision, or "necessary to reuse"
defense, even in cases where it appears that the patent holder is
suppressing the patented invention.66 In the typical case, if an
individual wants to add a "bell or whistle," or some other
improvement, to an existing patented invention, and market the result
as a new product, she must obtain the permission of the patent holder
before she makes, uses, or sells her improved version of the
invention.67 While sufficiently radical improvements can avoid a
finding of infringement, and hence the need for a license from the
patent holder,68 even an improvement that is itself novel and
nonobvious, and hence entitled to its own patent, may still require
permission from the original patent holder before a device or process
incorporating the improvement can be made, used, or sold.69 Patent
law's decision to require licenses before improvements can be made to
a patented invention, and the underlying premise that voluntary
licensing adequately addresses the incremental nature of progress in
the useful arts, suggests that copyright can also rely on voluntary
licensing to ensure access to those elements that later authors need to
ensure that progress in'the useful arts may continue.7"
65. See id. at 199-200.
66. See Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378-80 (1945); see also Data Gen.
Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 E3d 1147, 1185-87 (1st Cir. 1994) (refusing to
license unilaterally copyrighted or patented goods is presumptively lawful even if it gives
the copyright or patent holder market power in a relevant antitrust market).
67. See, e.g., Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 E2d 1569,
1580 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 731 F.2d 840, 847-48
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
68. See, e.g., Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d
1558, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
69. See Atlas Powder Co., 750 F2d at 1580.
70. Commentators have articulated a number of differences between patent and
copyright law that they believe make patent better suited to the protection of useful articles.
See, e.g., Dennis S. Kaijala & Peter S. Menell, Applying Fundamental Copyright Principles
to Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., 10 JuRjMErRIcS J. 177, 183-86
(1995). First, they argue that patent law has higher standards for protection, requiring an
invention to be not merely original, but novel and nonobvious. See, e.g., id. at 185-86.
However, the nonobvious standard only ensures that patents are awarded to those inventions
that are most creative, difficult, and valuable, which are also the same inventions that others
are likely to want to license to reuse. Second, they argue that patent has a much shorter term
than copyright. See, e.g., id. While this has somewhat more persuasive force, very little that
was done more than seventeen years ago in the field of computer programming is worth
copying today. Thus, whether protection lasts seventeen years or seventy-five years, either
system of protection extends well beyond the "copying" life of computer programs. As a
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Moreover, the third policy concern, like the first policy concern,
is ultimately self-defeating. If useful works can progress only
incrementally, then ensuring the (timely) creation of each necessary
step along the way becomes that much more important for a field to
advance. If we deny copyright protection for "intermediate" or "step"
elements, because they are necessary for future works, then we
undermine the incentive to create such elements, and risk not having
the elements when we need them.
Finally, whatever merit there may be in granting later authors
some additional copying leeway when they have improved a useful
work, the policies supporting such an exception should play little role
in the Lotus case. Borland has not copied the Lotus command
structure because Borland wanted to build on, and improve, the Lotus
command structure, or because such copying was necessary to
result, the extra fifty-eight years that copyright provides, as compared to patent, is largely
immaterial. Third, some commentators have argued that the scope of copyright and patent,
respectively, are tailored to allow and to provide the sorts of variety in their respective
protected subject matters that consumers desire. See 1, 2 PAUL GOLDSTnEIN, CoPYiGrr
§§ 2.15, 8.5 (2d ed. 1996) (suggesting that consumers desire more variety with respect to
works of authorship than with respect to inventions, and that the patent and copyright
systems are tailored to provide the desired variety); Karjala & Menell, supra, at 185
(suggesting that consumers desire more variety with respect to inventions than with respect
to works of authorship, and that the patent and copyright systems are tailored to provide the
desired variety). This, however, is both wrong and illogical. It is wrong because both patent
and copyright prohibit some forms of variety consumers would desire. It is illogical because
consumers' preferences for variety ought to be irrelevant to the scope of protection either
provides. For example, if consumers do not want a certain form of variety, ten versions of
War and Peace for example, then the law need not prohibit such variety because given a
lack of demand for such variety, there is no incentive to create it. Similarly, if consumers
want a certain form of variety, for example, ten later works detailing different events in the
life of Scarlett O'Hara, then the law should prohibit others from providing such variety only
if such prohibition is necessary to ensure an appropriate incentive for the creation of the
original work in which the characters first appeared. Fourth, some commentators have
asserted that patent law's use of claims to define the scope of the patent monopoly provides
greater certainty than copyright's infringement test, and therefore allows later inventors to
proceed with their work without fear of infringing the earlier patented inventions in the field.
See, e.g., Karijala & Menell, supra, at 185. Given the doctrine of equivalents, however, this
notion that patent claims provide certainty in determining infringement is false. See Paper
Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11, 19 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("[That]
argument is based on the utopian belief that a copier 'should be able to look to the patent
claims and know whether his [or her] activity infringes or not.' Although this may be a
desirable goal for the patent laws, it is not the law as it exists. In particular, the doctrine of
equivalents has been judicially created to ensure that a patentee can receive full protection
for his or her patented ideas by making it difficult for a copier to maneuver around a patent's
claims. In view of this doctrine, a copier rarely knows whether his product 'infringes' a
patent or not until a district court passes on the issue.").
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improve and create more efficient electronic spreadsheets. Rather,
what Borland copied, it copied exactly, as a competitor, in order to
render its product a more perfect substitute for the original Lotus 1-2-3
program.
4. Summary
This analysis suggests that, of the three policy concerns
articulated by Judge Stahl, two are self-defeating in that they try to
ensure access after-the-fact by denying protection to the Lotus
command structure, without considering how that denial of protection
will reduce the incentive to create, and hence the supply of, original
command structures in the future. While the second may prove
relevant to defining a work's unprotected ideas, it relies upon
unproven, and questionable, empirical propositions, and cannot, in any
event, justify the First Circuit's decision without a careful
consideration of two additional questions. These two additional
questions are: first, whether denying protection to the "lock-in"
element would lead to the underprotection of such works, and second,
if it would, whether, given a choice between protecting or denying
protection to the lock-in element, underprotection or overprotection
would come closer to providing the optimal level of copyright
protection. Thus, while the First Circuit may have, and in my opinion
did, reach the correct conclusion, its reasoning does not justify or even
explain its conclusion, and cannot therefore serve as an adequate basis
for denying protection to the Lotus command structure.
B. The District Court's Approach
As discussed, the district court, in its decision, identified a higher
level of abstraction as the relevant idea behind the Lotus user interface,
and thereby ensured protection for Lotus's particular command
structure.71 Yet, in doing so, the district court provided little
justification for the level of abstraction it selected as the program's
relevant idea. Parsing the district court's opinion -suggests three
potential justifications. First, the district court argued that because the
Lotus command structure came first, the desire of users to have other
71. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 F. Supp. 203, 217-18 (D. Mass.
1992), adhered to 831 F. Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd, 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
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spreadsheets that were compatible with the commands of, and data
files and macros created for use with, the Lotus spreadsheet was not
relevant to defining the Lotus program's idea. 2 Second, the district
court reasoned that, if it selected a more concrete level of abstraction
as the program's idea, "[no aspect of a useful work] would be
copyrightable."' 3 Third, the district court repeatedly emphasized that
"[a] very satisfactory spreadsheet menu tree can be constructed using
different commands and a different command structure from those of
Lotus 1-2-3. ,7
Yet, all three of these potential justifications are contrary to the
Court's decision in Baker v. Selden." Like Lotus's work, Selden's
accounting system came first, and the desiie of consumers for blank
forms that would work with Selden's specific system were the result of
Selden's initial creation of his particular accounting system. The
Baker Court nevertheless ruled that Selden's system, and the forms
necessary to use that system, were unprotected. Similarly, even though
selecting a more concrete level of abstraction as the relevant idea
effectively incorporated all of the elements that Selden selected for his
particular accounting system as part of his works' idea, and thereby
denied protection for any aspect of Selden's approach to accounting,
the Baker Court selected Selden's particular accounting system, not a
higher level of abstraction, as the relevant idea of Selden's work.
Third, if the Baker Court had selected a higher level of abstraction,
such as "accounting system" or "double-entry accounting system" or
even "double-entry accounting system arranged to convey information
that displays accounts for a relevant time period on a single page" as
the relevant idea of Selden's work, then Selden's particular version of
a double-entry accounting system would have been only one of many
ways to express such idea. Selecting such a higher level of abstraction
as the works' idea would have left room for others to create their own
double-entry accounting systems without using the elements Selden
selected for his particular version, and would have suggested that
Selden's particular accounting system should be considered
expression. Nevertheless, the Baker Court concluded that Selden's
particular accounting system was unprotected, even if there were other,
72. See id. at 212-14.
73. Id. at217-19.
74. Id. at 217.
75. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
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equally useful accounting systems available.76 The Baker Court's
ruling would, therefore, seem to undermine substantially the district
court's proffered justifications.
In a separate case, Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback
Software International,77 the same district judge had previously
addressed the level of abstraction issue with respect to the Lotus user
interface and had articulated several additional reasons for selecting a
higher level of abstraction as the relevant idea of the Lotus interface.
Although the district court appeared at times to misunderstand that
"idea" and "expression" are simply labels that courts should apply in a
manner that best fulfills copyright's objectives,78 it articulated three
policy concerns that would support its identification of a more abstract
level as the work's relevant idea. First, the district court correctly
noted that nan'owing protection for a particular class of works to
ensure after-the-fact access, will reduce the before-the-fact incentive to
create such works. Such an approach will necessarily encourage
investment in less valuable and less useful works, instead of
encouraging investment in the more valuable, more useful works.79
Second, the district court argued that other companies, including
Borland, had created electronic spreadsheets without duplicating the
Lotus command structure. 0 While the district court used the existence
of other, noninfringing spreadsheets simply to establish that there were
many ways to express the Lotus program's idea, that was a truism
given the district court's identification of the work's relevant idea.
Nevertheless, the existence of other noninfringing spreadsheets also
suggests: (i) that there is a competitive market for new users; and (ii)
that the costs for an established Lotus user of switching to another
spreadsheet program may not be substantial. If either suggestion were
true, then the existence of other, noninfringing spreadsheets would
provide a basis to infer that protecting the Lotus command structure
would not grant Lotus an undue degree of market power over the
76. See id. at 103-04.
77. 740 . Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
78. See id. at 52-54, 58-61, 65 (identifying the most abstract level of work as an
"electronic spreadsheet," and adopting that as the work's idea without further discussion).
79. Id. at 58.
80. Id. at 66-68; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 799 . Supp. 203,
214 (D. Mass. 1992) (noting that Borland could have created a program "for use in the
Quattro programs' native modes"), adhered to 831 F Supp. 223 (D. Mass. 1993), rev'd, 49
F3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996).
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electronic spreadsheet "market" generally, or over existing Lotus users
specifically.
Third, the district court chose to "credit the testimony of expert
witnesses [who asserted] that the bulk of the creative work is in the
conceptualization of a computer program and its user interface, rather
than in its encoding."8  As a result, the district court argued, if
copyright allowed competitors to copy a computer program's concept
and user interface so long as they wrote their own code to implement
the concept and interface, such a result would substantially undermine
the incentives to invest in original works, and would be
"fundamentally inconsistent with the mandates of the copyright law."
82
Yet, the fallacy of this third argument is that copyright often fails
to protect a work's most creative and valuable elements. Indeed,
copyright often expressly refuses to protect a work's most creative and
valuable elements. For example, in addressing infringement in the
context of a traditional literary work, Judge Hand in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp. assumed that the defendant had copied
elements from the plaintiff's work that were both original to the
plaintiff and the basis for "her amazing success." 83  Nevertheless,
despite the value of these elements, and the creativity they reflected,
Judge Hand ruled that the taking of such elements was not copyright
infringement--"[t]hough the plaintiff discovered the vein, she could
not keep it to herself."' Similarly, in Baker v. Selden, there can be
little doubt that Selden's system itself represented the most creative
and valuable aspect of his works. Yet, the Court ruled that the
particular system that Selden created was free for the taking.8
Given these decisions, the mere taking of something creative and
valuable is not, on its own, sufficient to establish copyright
infringement. By failing to reconcile his ruling with these two earlier
decisions and the principles of copyright law they embody, Judge
Keeton also omitted a critical step in his analysis.
81. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. at 56.
82. Id.; see also Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 26 F.3d
1335, 1344 (5th Cir. 1994); Autoskill, Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d
1476, 1495 n.23 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 307 (1993). Mitch Kapor, the founder
of Lotus and designer of Lotus 1-2-3, has joined with several other authors to reiterate his
views on this issue in a recent copyright article. See Samuelson et al., supra note 43.
83. 45 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
84. Id.
85. 101 U.S. 99, 103-05 (1879).
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Ill. COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT, REASONING, AND RESULTS
If the reasoning of neither the district court nor the First Circuit is
fully adequate, there remains the task of suggesting how a court should
approach the infringement issue, and how it should decide whether
particular copying establishes infringement. To begin that task, we
return to Figure 1. In Figure 1, we assumed that there was some level
of copyright protection that would lead the market to produce the
optimal quantity and variety of copyrighted works. Defining what we
mean by optimal production is easy: Production of copyrighted works
is optimal when committing additional or fewer resources to the
production of such works would reduce social welfare. Getting from
there to a workable legal rule, however, has proven more problematic,
with phrases such as "free-riders," "externality," "public goods,"
"market failure," and "suboptimal production" often substituted for
reasoned analysis.
At the heart of copyright lies a reasonably simple problem: In the
absence of copyright, competitors may more quickly, more easily, and
more exactly duplicate the creativity embodied in the average work of
authorship, than they can duplicate the creativity embodied in the
average nonwork product. Because of the greater ease with which a
competitor may copy creativity embodied in a work of authorship, an
individual who invests her creativity in a work of authorship will
receive a lower price for her creativity than she would receive for
investing it in a nonwork product that is otherwise comparable. The
lower price received, in the absence of copyright, for creativity
invested in an otherwise comparable work of authorship would lead an
individual to invest, at the margins, in an additional nonwork product,
even though the resources could have been invested in an additional
work of greater value to society. This dedication of resources to a less
valuable nonwork product, rather than a more valuable work, is the
"underproduction" that copyright aims to remedy.
Yet we must be careful not to push this underproduction rationale
too far. The difference between works of authorship and nonwork
products is not that works of authorship embody creativity while
nonwork products do not, nor is it that competitors can copy the
creativity embodied in a work of authorship, but cannot copy the
creativity embodied in a nonwork product. Rather, the difference is
that, in the absence of copyright, competitors can copy the creativity
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embodied in a work of authorship more easily than they can copy the
creativity embodied in nonwork products. It is a difference in degree,
not in kind. As a result, copyright's task is not to prohibit copying of
any sort, or even to prohibit the copying of any creative (i.e., original)
element. Rather, copyright's task is to prohibit only that copying that
would enable a competitor to duplicate the creativity embodied in a
work of authorship more quickly, more easily, and more exactly, than
she could copy the creativity embodied in one of the wide range of
creative products copyright leaves unprotected.86
Only when the advantages a competitor can obtain by copying
become significantly greater with respect to works of authorship than
they are with respect to creative nonwork products generally is there a
risk that individuals will invest too little creativity in such works. As a
result, copyright should concern itself only when, given the nature of
the creative product at issue, and the extent and nature of the copying
involved, a competitor could obtain an "undue" copying advantage in
the absence of legal protection. Considering the issues in terms of
whether a competitor can obtain such an undue advantage by copying
illuminates two key aspects of the Lotus case. First, it explains why
creative, useful things have historically been dealt with principally
under the rubric of patent, rather than copyright, law. Second, it
provides a standard by which we can determine whether particular
copying has gone too far.
A. The Line between Patent and Copyright
In comparing patent and copyright, even a casual observer will
observe that the two regimes require quite different levels of creativity
before they will extend their protection to a creative effort. Patent
requires an invention to be both novel and nonobvious in order to
receive protection.87 In contrast, copyright will extend its protection so
long as a work is original.88 While commentators have articulated a
86. Alternatively, we might prohibit the copying of creativity in any form. However,
as I have explained elsewhere, such an approach would not only stifle growth in the
"Science and the useful Arts," it would also be both inefficient and unfair. See Lunney,
supra note 22.
87. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12(1966).
88. As Judge Hand explained, "[I]f by some magic a man who had never known it
were to compose anew Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an 'author,' and, if he
copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats's."
Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures, 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 669
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number of reasons for this difference, I would suggest that the differing
standards turn almost entirely on the practical differences involved in
copying the creativity embodied in an invention rather than a work.
Specifically, the creativity embodied in an invention is usually
more difficult to copy as a practical matter, than the creativity
embodied in a work of authorship. Compare, for example, two
creative endeavors: the design of an automobile and the writing of a
novel. Even if we assume that both the car and the novel embody
similar absolute levels of creativity, a competitor will, in the absence
of any intellectual property protection, face a far more difficult task
copying the creativity embodied in the car. While a competitor can
obtain some cost and time savings by copying someone else's car
design, the competitor would still have to purchase the steel, plastic,
and many other materials required, and hire the skilled labor necessary,
to construct her cars. As a result, the savings a competitor can obtain
by copying a car design are likely to represent a trivial share, perhaps
five percent, of the resulting per vehicle cost. In contrast, copying the
novel will usually present a/far less difficult task. A competitor need
only place the novel on a photocopying machine, or use a scanner to
replicate the text. Even a competitor seeking to produce trade-quality
copies could use high-quality photographic reproduction and thereby
achieve a substantial cost savings in creating competing copies of the
work.
89
Because of this difference in the materials from which they are
made, and the skill, time, and effort required to copy the creativity
embodied, a competitor could, in the absence of any legal protection,
obtain a significant copying advantage with respect to an invention
only when the creativity embodied in the invention represented a
substantial advance in the art. If the advance in question was minor, or
"obvious," usually the material cost, skilled labor, and time required to
(1936); see also Scholz Homes, Inc. v. Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 86 (6th Cir. 1967) (holding
that constructing a building using copied plans is not copying); Harold Lloyd Corp. v.
Witwer, 65 E2d 1, 4 (9th Cir.) (holding that "[s]ince there can be no infringement of
copyright without some copying, the mere fact of similarity.., does not of itself make one
an infringement of the other" (internal quote omitted)), cert. dismissed, 296 U.S. 669
(1933).
89. Empirical evidence that Justice Breyer gathered suggests that a second publisher
employing high-quality photographic reproduction techniques could, in the absence of
copyright, create copies of an original work at less than half the cost of the first publisher.
See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HAR. L. RE. 281,294-99 (1970).
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replicate the machine or process in which the advance appeared
would, as a practical matter, prevent a competitor from obtaining a
significant advantage over the originator, even if we leave competitors
free to copy such minor advances. For such minor advances, the
advantages associated with being the first in a market to offer the
advance, including the lead-time monopoly and consumer recognition
a first mover obtains, ensure that, despite the possibility of copying
competitors, the originator will receive compensation appropriate to
the creativity invested. In recognition of this, patent law uses the
nonobviousness requirement to separate those substantial, or
"nonobvious," advances in the art that warrant protection, from the
more minor advances that do not. In contrast, because the creativity
embodied in traditional works of authorship is practically easier to
copy, a competitor can obtain a significant copying advantage, even for
works that embody only a minimal level of creativity.' ° Indeed, so
long as the original author did her own work, the ease with which a
competitor can mechanically copy a traditional work of authorship
would give the competitor a significant advantage over the original
author even if the work copied embodied nothing more than a
minimally creative rearrangement or compilation of well-known
elements.91 For that reason, copyright sets a much lower threshold for
its protection, and uses the originality standard to ensure that even
minimally creative works receive protection.
Historically, patent, not copyright, better defined the degree of
creativity required with respect to useful articles before legal
protection of the creativity embodied in such an article was justified.
Until recently, the utility of a creative endeavor provided a reasonably
accurate way of estimating the ease with which a competitor could
copy the embodied creativity. Useful articles were more likely to be
made of steel, concrete, and other physical substances that made the
practical task of copying the creativity embodied in them more
difficult.92 Because of the material expense and skilled labor typically
90. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903);
Breyer, supra note 89, at 294-99.
91. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994) (extending protection to compilations of preexisting
materials).
92. I realize that copyright protects sculptural works that may be created from steel
and concrete, and that this creates some difficulty for a theory of copyright based entirely
upon the ease with which competitors may practically copy works of authorship. See
Lunney, supra note 22, at nn.24, 386; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An
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required to reproduce the creativity embodied in a useful article,
competitors could obtain a significant advantage by copying only
when such useful articles represented a substantial advance over the
prior art. As a result, the nonobvious standard of patent law better
captured the level of creativity required before the copying advantage
available to competitors with respect to creative useful articles rose to
a level that would justify legal protection.
Utility, then, was not the underlying policy justification for
applying patent's nonobviousness standard, rather than copyright's
originality standard, to determine whether a creative product warranted
legal protection against copying. Rather, a product's utility served as
an effective proxy for the relative ease with which a competitor could
copy the creativity embodied in the product. As a proxy, utility
suggested whether, given the practical difficulties involved in copying,
patent's nonobviousness or copyright's originality standard better
identified the degree of creativity required before a competitor's
copying advantage became sufficient to warrant legal intervention.93
Historically, then, a court could relegate useful articles to patent
protection without worrying that such a choice would allow
competitors to obtain an undue copying advantage with respect to the
creativity embodied in the article.
Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 329 (1989). However, the
exception does not disprove the rule. But see Samuelson et al., supra note 43, at 2323
(arguing that protection of statues made from steel and concrete proves that material of
manufacture is irrelevant to question whether copyright should protect a creative endeavor).
Congress routinely enacts statutes that are under- and over-inclusive, either unintentionally
or in response to disproportionate interest group pressure. As a result, that government has
enacted certain laws in no way proves that such laws are just or desirable. Moreover,
protection for such statues is based principally upon the need to protect such works, not
from copying competitors, but from unauthorized derivative works. See, e.g., Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, [1991-92] Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 1 26,860 (D.D.C.
1991) (parties disputing ownership of copyright in statue under works-for-hire doctrine in
order to determine who could authorize creating scale models from the original); see also
Lunney, supra note 22, at n.386.
93. Courts, for example, have historically protected blueprints as copyrighted works,
and have prohibited the duplication of such blueprints, but have refused to protect the
structures themselves, or to prohibit someone from building a structure using someone else's
copyrighted blueprints. See Donald Frederick Evans & Assocs., Inc. v. Continental Homes,
Inc., 785 F.2d 897, 904-05 (11th Cir. 1986) (copying plans themselves constitutes
infringement, while building home using the plans does not); Scholz Homes, Inc. v.
Maddox, 379 F.2d 84, 86 (6th Cir. 1967) (suggesting that unauthorized copies of plans is
infringement even if building constructed using copied plans should not be considered a
copy); see also Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 E2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1972) (same);
Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 680 R Supp. 658, 664-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same).
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While utility was once an effective proxy for the practical
difficulties associated with copying embodied creativity, modem
technology, particularly computer programming, has reduced the
accuracy with which the useful/entertaining line predicts the relative
ease with which a competitor may copy the creativity embodied in a
product. As a result, for certain useful goods, the useful/entertaining
dichotomy no longer accurately suggests the degree of creativity
required before a competitor's copying advantage becomes sufficient
to warrant legal intervention. As the National Commission on New
Technological Uses recognized, computer programs, unlike many
useful goods, are exceptionally easy and require little skill to copy. As
a result, competitors can obtain a substantial copying advantage even
with respect to those computer programs that embody only a minimal
level of creativity.94 Because of the tremendous ease with which the
creativity embodied in a program can be copied, copyright's originality
standard, rather than patent's nonobviousness standard, better defines
the level of creativity the law should require before it protects the
typical computer program from copying.95
B. When Copying Goes Too Far
Turning from this issue to the scope of protection issue, a focus
on undue copying advantage suggests a general standard for
identifying when a defendant's copying of a copyrighted work has
gone too far: Copying constitutes infringement when, given the nature
of the work copied, the nature and amount of material taken, and the
use which is made of the material taken, the copying would provide a
competitor with a copying advantage significantly greater than the
copying advantage we tolerate for the wide range of creative goods
copyright leaves unprotected.96 I have used empirical evidence to
suggest that copyright can satisfy this standard simply by prohibiting
competitors from engaging in mechanical, and near exact duplication,
94. See CONTU, FINALREPORT, supra note 37, at 10-11.
95. Even after we provide copyright protection for computer programs generally,
certain substantial advances in the art of computer programming may warrant patent
protection as well.
96. It is no coincidence that this general standard duplicates much of the fair use
analysis. As I have explained elsewhere, see Lunney, supra note 22, courts originally
devised the fair use standard to address this precise issue, to determine whether the copying




of a copyrighted work,9 7 and I do not want to revisit that issue here.
Rather, I would like to use this general standard, and the notion of
undue copying advantage, both to explain the results in Baker v.
Selden and Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., and to suggest how
courts should approach the question of whether any given instance of
actual copying constitutes infringement.
From the viewpoint of undue copying advantage, the outcomes in
both Baker and Nichols are consistent with an approach that asks
whether the copying at issue would give the copier an undue copying
advantage in creating a competing work. For example, if we focus on
Baker's actions, he read Selden's works,98 internalized Selden's
analysis and his system, and understood Selden's works well enough
to create his own independent explanation of that system. 99 Even
given his independent effort, Baker undoubtedly obtained some
advantages by copying Selden's system and the accounting form
associated with it, rather than creating his own. But given that Baker
read, understood, and explained in his own words Selden's system, the
extent of the copying advantage he obtained was not likely to be
significantly greater than the copying advantages we allow competitors
to obtain with respect to the wide range of creative goods copyright
leaves unprotected, or with the copying advantages patent law permits
competitors to obtain. 1°° Similarly, Universal Pictures may have taken
the conflicts, characters, and play of emotions that made Nichols's
work popular, and thereby saved considerable time, effort, and money
in producing its film. But again, despite the copying and the
advantages Universal Pictures thereby obtained in creating a
competing work, Universal Pictures had to add substantial effort of its
own before it could turn what it had taken into a marketable work.
The effort required of Universal Pictures ensured that whatever
copying advantage it may have obtained, that copying advantage was
not likely to be significantly greater than we tolerate generally for the
97. See Lunney, supra note 22.
98. Because it appears that Baker, like most copiers, purchased the copies of
Selden's works that he relied upon in creating his own work, the label 'free-rider" is literally
inaccurate and should be avoided.
99. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 100 (1879).
100. As the Court explained, "the proof fails to show that [Baker] has violated the
copyright of Selden's book, regarding the latter merely as an explanatory work." Id. at 101.
For a discussion of the extent of the copying advantages the patent law permits competitors
to obtain, see infra note 103.
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many creative goods copyright leaves unprotected, or with the copying
advantages patent law permits competitors to obtain.
From this perspective, the central issue raised in the Lotus case is
whether allowing competitors to copy the Lotus command structure
would enable a typical competitor to obtain a copying advantage with
respect to the Lotus program significantly greater than the copying
advantage we tolerate generally with respect to other forms of
creativity. °1 Certainly, Borland, Paperback, and others may have
saved substantial time and money in attempting to create electronic
spreadsheets by copying the Lotus command structure. 102  Yet,
substantial savings are not enough. Even given the availability of
patent protection, we allow competitors to obtain substantial copying
advantages with respect to creative nonwork products." 3 Despite
these copying advantages, we have concluded that the advantages
associated with being the first in a market, including the lead-time
monopoly and consumer recognition a first mover obtains, ensure that
creative individuals will receive adequate recompense for their efforts,
rendering additional legal protection unnecessary."°  Given this
101. While I have considered the issue solely in terms of whether copying the
command structure constitutes infringement and have not considered the differing
circumstance between, for example, Borland's copying and Paperback's copying, the Court
might want to draw a distinction between copying of the command structure by a competitor
who has their own interface, and a competitor who copies the command structure to create a
clone of Lotus 1-2-3.
102. See Samuelson et al., supra note 43, at 2337-91; see also Lotus Dev. Corp. v.
Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 58, 66-68 (D. Mass. 1990).
103. Professors Mansfield, Schwartz, and Wagner have gathered empirical evidence
on copying advantages that suggests that, even with the availability of patent protection, the
copying advantages we allow competitors outside the field of copyright enables competitors
to expend on research and development less than sixty percent of the amount spent on
research and development by the originator in a field, in bringing competing products to
market. See Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91
EcON. J. 907, 907-10 (1981).
104. Some have argued that such protection is necessary, or at least desirable, for
creative designs and would suggest that narrowing copyright to match the protection
available for creative designs, for example, or other creative efforts is undesirable. Instead,
we should expand the protection available for these other forms of creativity to match that
copyright presently provides creativity embodied in works of authorship. I must disagree.
In a representative democracy, Congress is most likely to act to promote the interests of
society as whole when it considers an issue that pits a concentrated group against a
concentrated group. See, e.g., Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings
Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1892, 1946-54 (1992). Historically, proposed design
legislation, patent protection, to a certain extent, and the proposal to tax videocassettes and
videocassette recorders sales have represented such concentrated-concentrated disputes. In
each of these cases, Congress has refused to enact the requisite protection, strongly
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treatment of creativity embodied in nonwork products, a risk of
underproduction with respect to works of authorship arises only when
a failure to prohibit certain copying would allow competitors to obtain
a significantly greater copying advantage than that we ordinarily
tolerate for creativity embodied in nonwork products. The question
then is whether a competitor, by copying the Lotus command structure
could obtain an advantage in producing a competing product
significantly greater than that available with respect to creative
nonwork products.
From the available evidence, it does not appear that Lotus has
established 5 that copyright, by allowing the copying of the Lotus
command structure, would permit a competitor to obtain a
significantly greater copying advantage than we tolerate for creative
goods generally. 1°6 As in the Baker case, by the time a competitor has
purchased a copy of the Lotus program, taken the time to learn and
understand the command structure, and written her own code to
replicate the functionality of the Lotus 1-2-3 program, the copying
advantage the competitor will obtain is probably not sufficient to
justify legal intervention.' °7 The copying advantages may be sub-
suggesting that such protection would not serve society's interests as a whole. In contrast,
an expansion in copyright protection generally represents a dispersed-concentrated conflict.
Such expansions principally benefit a concentrated, well-organized group, authors and
publishers, at the expense of consumers generally. Given such a conflict, we should expect
over time that copyright will come to serve the interest of the special interest group involved
at the expense of society as a whole. As a result, political process concerns suggest that
copyright presently provides excessive protection for works of authorship, while the
protection available for nonwork products is likely set at an appropriate level.
105. While the Court has flip-flopped on who bears the burden of proof under the fair
use analysis, compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 (1994)
(placing fair use burden of proof on defendant) with Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447, 451 (1984) (placing fair use burden of proof on plaintiff), I believe
fair use is properly understood as the test for determining whether copying has gone too far.
Because proof that the copying has gone too far has always been part of the plaintiff's case,
and for a number of other reasons, I believe the Court should place the burden of proof on
this issue on the plaintiff claiming infringement.
106. Because I conclude that copying of the command structure does not
"underprotect" the Lotus program, I need not balance the risks presented by under- and
over-protection that might arise where the Court must choose between over- or under-
protecting a work. See. supra text accompanying note 62.
107. In a recent law review article, Professor Samuelson et al. suggested that the costs
to a competitor of writing her own code that would duplicate the Lotus command structure
were trivial. See Samuelson et al., supra note 43, at 2337-39. I must, respectfully, disagree.
The costs are certainly not trivial in the ordinary sense of the word. The cost of using my
television remote to change the channel is trivial; the effort involved in writing any
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stantial in some sense, but the available empirical evidence suggests
that they are not likely to be significantly greater than the copying
advantages we tolerate generally for creative goods.108 As a result, the
copying of the Lotus 1-2-3 command structure should not constitute
infringement.
IV. COPYRIGHT AND COMPUTER PROGRAMS
This analysis suggests that the issues surrounding copyright's
protection of computer programs are not materially different than the
issues surrounding copyright's protection of more traditional works of
authorship. In determining whether actual copying has gone too far
marketable program, let alone one that would duplicate every function performed by Lotus
1-2-3, is not. Even in comparison to the cost to the original author, the costs are not trivial.
On this issue, some of the points Professor Samuelson et al. make are just plain odd. They
suggest that having seen the Xerox interface, the cost to Steve Jobs and Apple of creating
the Macintosh operating system were trivial. Presumably, then, the cost to Microsoft to
create Windows, having seen the Macintosh, were also trivial. And having seen Windows
itself, the cost of creating Windows '95 must also have been trivial. As a factual matter,
these assertions are simply untrue. My own information suggests that Apple spent more on
its Mac operating system than Xerox spent on its Lisa operating system; that Microsoft spent
more on its initial Windows operating system than Apple spent on its initial Mac operating
system; and that Microsoft spent more on its Windows '95 operating system than it had on
the earlier versions of its Windows operating system. Moreover, as the division between
patent and copyright discussion makes clear, we should not isolate the cost savings available
with respect to design alone, but must focus on the cost savings that occurs as a percentage
of the per-copy cost of the program as marketed. Thus, even if copying allowed a
competitor to save the design costs entirely, legal prohibition against such copying would
nevertheless be unnecessary if the physical costs of reproducing that design in a marketable
form were substantial.
108. Since it introduced the first version of Lotus 1-2-3 in 1983, Lotus has sold more
than twelve million copies of the spreadsheet program. See Ross, supra note 61, at 74
(estimated sales of 6 million DOS-based spreadsheets from 1992 to 1995, with Lotus
holding a 70% market share, or sales of roughly 4.2 million over that period); Marc Ferranti,
Borland Woos Corporate Users with QPro 4.0, PC WEEK, Mar. 2, 1992, at 37 (Lotus sold 9
million copies of 1-2-3 program since program was introduced in 1983). Even if we assume
that Lotus reasonably spent more than $120 million on deciding the particular set of menu
commands and their hierarchical arrangement within the Lotus 1-2-3 program alone, and
that a competitor such as Borland could save that entire sum by copying Lotus's particular
command structure, the millions Lotus invested on the command structure would represent
only ten dollars of the cost associated with each of the twelve million copies of the program
Lotus has sold. Given that Lotus has sold copies of its programs at a price of more than
$300 for new users, and a price of $100 for upgrades, the ten dollars in cost Borland can
save as a result of its copying represents only ten percent of the cost of upgrades, and less
than four percent of the cost for new users. Given that we routinely permit competitors to
obtain cost savings on the order of forty percent by copying, the copying advantage Borland




and thereby become an infringement, the central issue in either case is
whether the copying would enable a competitor to obtain a savings in
terms of the time and money required to create and market a
competing work significantly greater than the savings we tolerate for
creative nonwork products generally. Only if such a disproportionate
or undue copying advantage would otherwise result should copyright
step in and prohibit the copying at issue.
Over the last century, since Baker v. Selden, courts have lost sight
of the copying advantage issue which is the central, and, indeed, only
sensible, justification for copyright. Instead of focusing on that issue,
courts have taken to dividing works into the useful and the not useful,
and with the paradoxical suggestion that they are thereby promoting
access to the useful, extended minimal protection to the useful, and
expansive protection to the not useful. The necessary result of such an
approach is to encourage production of the not useful, at the expense
of the useful. Such an approach is not only at odds with its purported
justification, but it is also inefficient and unfair to those whose flair for
creativity lies in authoring useful works.
Whatever merits the useful/not useful dichotomy may once have
had, changing technology has rendered it inadequate, and indeed
counterproductive, as a tool for determining eligibility for, and the
scope of, copyright's protection today. As a result, to avoid the
internal conflicts inherent in the dichotomy, and to provide a more
sensible approach to copyright's key issues, courts should turn away
from the useful/not useful dichotomy, and refocus copyright on the
disproportionate ease with which a competitor can copy the creativity
embodied in a work of authorship.
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